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20 July 1967, 10 a.m.

DCI BRIEFING FOR THE  
CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

Referral Review by NIMA completed 3/13/01

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

THE MOSCOW AIR SHOW

I. The first major Soviet air show in six years was held near Moscow on July 8 and 9.

A. The Soviets unveiled six new fighters, all of which we knew about ahead of time

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1. You may recall that I briefed this subcommittee last October 3 on five of the new Soviet fighters then under development

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B. As a result, there were no great surprises for us in the air show, although we have been able to add a number of new details

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II. Only one of these new fighters has been produced in any quantity so far.

(PHOTO, Twin-jet Sukhoy)

A. This is a new twin-jet Sukhoy, which can reach speeds of Mach 2.5 and altitudes of 72,000 feet.

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1.

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we expect

widespread deployment to begin early next year.

2. It will be used as a high-altitude interceptor, and its weapons system is one of the best in the Soviet air defense inventory.

(PHOTO, twin-jet Mikoyan)

B. The twin-jet Mikoyan is another Mach 2.5

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fighter I showed you in October.

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the aircraft could be operational in 1969.

(PHOTO, swing-wing Mikoyan)

C. Here is another Mikoyan-designed fighter

which is a swing-wing, <sup>sweeping</sup> ~~folding~~ its wings back

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in flight for higher speeds.

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(PHOTO, single-engine Mikoyan)

D. A third new aircraft from the Mikoyan design team is this single-engine, delta-wing jet, designed to operate from short runways. This one is still in an early stage of flight testing.

(PHOTO, VTOL Yak)

E. The press has made considerable fuss about this Vertical Take-Off and Landing aircraft; in the Yak (or Yakovlev) series.

1.

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2. Range, speed and altitude capabilities are not impressive, and the Soviet Air Forces probably won't use it for much except air shows unless it is modified extensively.

(PHOTO, swing-wing Sukhoy)

F. This aircraft is apparently a swing-wing variant of the standard SU-7 fighter-bomber.

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III. The Soviets did not show all of their new aircraft.

A. Among those missing was the E-266, which set world speed records in 1965. This is purely a research aircraft, and will not be produced in quantity.

(PHOTO, "Fat Yak")

B. This aircraft, which we call the "Fat Yak,"

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[REDACTED] It is now undergoing engine flight testing, and was probably not ready for display at the air show. We believe it is designed to support ground troops.

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IV. [REDACTED] no evidence that the Soviets are developing a new heavy bomber. Nothing at the air show pointed in this direction.

A. The only long-range bomber in the flying demonstrations, in fact was the medium jet TU-22 BLINDER, which was in the 1961 air show and has been operational since 1962.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

BLACK SHIELD PROGRAM

I. I have reported to you on the termination of our OXCART project--the A-12 reconnaissance aircraft--which is to be phased out by December 1 this year in favor of the Air Force SR-71.

A. The SR-71, however, is not yet operational, and since the decision was made to terminate OXCART, we received permission to use our A-12 aircraft for coverage of North Vietnam.

B. We have flown [ ] missions [ ] with very successful results in what is normally the worst weather period of the year.


(MAP, COVERAGE OF NORTH VIETNAM)

C. With the [ ] missions, we have covered the area shown in red on this map--almost all of North Vietnam--obtaining usable photography of most of the key areas. The map shows only the areas where photography was 80 percent or better cloud-free.

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


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D. The Oxcart aircraft has proven itself, as we predicted, virtually invulnerable to the North Vietnamese air defense system.

1. We have been concentrating on the area shown in grey--the area defended by surface-to-air missiles.



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II. The flights are flown from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. They average about [REDACTED] covering about 6,850 statute miles each, but the time lapse over hostile territory is less than ten minutes in each case. In that time span, they can enter over Haiphong [REDACTED] cross North Vietnam, [REDACTED]

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
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A. The Okinawa and Japanese press is aware that the aircraft are flying from Okinawa, but coverage has been low-key and indicates that

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these are SR-71 test beds making test flights.

III. Our primary purpose in these missions has been to search for evidence that the Soviets might be deploying a surface-to-surface missile system.




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B. The OXCART system gives us high-resolution, simultaneous broad-area coverage which we cannot obtain effectively with other existing reconnaissance systems.

1. A mission on [redacted] for instance, covered more than 130 of the 180 usable surface-to-air missile sites, and found only about 20 sets of launching equipment. This is useful substantiation of our estimate that the North Vietnamese have 25 to 30 SAM firing battalions which they move from site to site.
2. Similarly, the second mission provided simultaneous coverage of all five major airfields in the Hanoi area, which is essential coverage for determining the air order of battle and fighter dispositions.

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C. As additional byproducts, we can use this photography for bomb-damage assessment, and to watch



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North Vietnamese transportation routes,  
checking up on the progress of our interdiction  
efforts.

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1. The mission on [ ] provided usable  
photography of more than 240 bridges in  
all parts of the country, and long stretches  
of roads, railroads, and canals.

(PHOTO, HAIPHONG PORT)

2. This picture was taken 18 miles from  
Haiphong, but the interpreter can identify  
most of the ships in port. Incidentally,  
no military cargo is visible.

IV. Thus the OXCART aircraft is not only providing  
information which we would otherwise not get, but  
it enables us to make better interpretation of the  
intelligence we get from other sources.

- A. It can probably provide even better coverage  
after the rainy season ends in September.
- B. The Air Force is confident that the SR-71 will  
be ready to take over in December as scheduled.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

- I. A second ceasefire between the Israelis and Arabs went into effect along the Suez Canal on July 15, and UN observers are now in place to supervise it, but the situation along the Canal remains very touchy.
  - A. One point of friction is whether the Israelis can use small boats in those portions of the Canal now open.
    1. The Egyptians contend that the East Bank of the Canal is the ceasefire line, and have told the UN that they would have "no choice" but to open fire if the Israelis attempt to place their boats in the waterway.
    2. The Israelis have maintained that the Canal itself--that is, the center of the Canal--is the ceasefire line, and that vessels from both sides therefore are entitled to use it.

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- a. A related issue in this case is peacetime transit rights through the Canal for the Israelis. They undoubtedly would like to establish a precedent of access now, which would put them in a tougher bargaining position during negotiations on a settlement.
3. Thus, it would be difficult for Israel to agree to a plan devised by the UN in New York by which both sides would refrain from any naval or military activity on the Canal. In any case, General Bull of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) has been instructed to discuss the plan with Israeli and Egyptian officials.
- B. As of noon Tuesday, seven UN military observers had taken up positions on each side of the Canal, and recruitment of the remainder of what will be a 33-man observer contingent was proceeding.

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1. The Egyptians have insisted that these observers communicate only in the clear--with voice radio--and that each team communicate only with UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem and Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers at Ismailia and Qantara respectively.
  - a. The members of each team presumably will be able to hear each other, however.
  - b. The UN gave in on the question of encrypted communications in order to get the operation launched, but it is continuing to pursue the matter with Egypt.
2. The only reported violation of the cease-fire since the UN observers took their positions is an Israeli claim that an Egyptian mortar shell was fired across the canal yesterday. There were no casualties.

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C. The fighting along the Canal on July 14 and 15 was the heaviest since the original June ceasefire.

1. The post-war incidents began in earnest on July 8 after a series of relatively minor clashes early in July.

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We do

not believe the incidents presage a resumption of full-scale hostilities.

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A. This has touched off considerable speculation on relations with the Soviet Union, because both the Egyptian and Syrian leadership are now more dependent on Soviet support, and more susceptible to Soviet influence, than before the war.

B. We do not believe that the radical Arab states are willing to become full members of the Communist camp, but they may now accept a closer relationship with Moscow, including a larger Soviet presence.

C. We believe that the Soviets, for their part, would hesitate to seek formal base rights on Arab territory, and that they almost certainly would not entertain the idea of a defense treaty.

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
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IV. The Soviets are having some difficulties working out details of military and political cooperation with the Arabs as a whole.

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C. These subjects were probably among the topics discussed by the three Arab delegations which have been in Moscow during the past few days.

1. Algerian Prime Minister Boumediene and Iraqi President Arif went to Moscow on

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July 17th after they finished a five-day meeting in Cairo with Nasir and Syrian President Attasi. They returned to Cairo the following day.

2. An Egyptian military group has been in Moscow for a week.

V. The pace of Soviet arms deliveries to the Arab states has settled down in the past few weeks.

A. Deliveries by sea continue to arrive at a rate of about two per week.

1. Sixteen Soviet ships have delivered some 38,000 tons of military equipment since June 5. Three-fourths of this has gone to Egypt.

2. At the current rate of shipments, it would take about a year to bring Egyptian and Syrian military hardware back to the levels on hand before hostilities began.

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B. The Soviet Union flew a total of 351 AN-12 transport aircraft to Arab countries between June 7 and July 2. These were devoted primarily--but not exclusively--to the delivery of jet fighters.

1. The aircraft are shipped disassembled.

It takes more than one transport, but less than two, to deliver the parts of one fighter.

2. Of the 351 flights, 211 went to Egypt, 77 to Algeria, 39 to Syria, and 24 to Iraq.

C. The first such flight since July 2 reached Cairo July 15, but this does not appear to indicate a resumption of the airlift.

1. It was presumably one of the occasional special flights the Soviet Union has sent in the past in answer to requests for expedited shipment of items in short supply--in this case possibly aircraft tires.

VI. King Husayn is still trying to promote a full-scale Arab summit meeting to unify Arab policy on a settlement, but his prospects appear bleak.

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
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B. The question of a summit, nevertheless, is to be discussed at an upcoming Arab foreign ministers' conference in Khartoum, for which a date has not yet been set.

VII. The Middle East crisis focused world attention for the first time on the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.

A. The Soviets increased their Mediterranean squadron when tension in the Middle East started to develop in May

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B. The USSR probably viewed this naval squadron as serving as a damper on action by the US Sixth Fleet, and as a show of support for the Arabs. It was probably never intended to provide direct military assistance to the Arab countries.

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- C. Soviet warships are visiting Egyptian and Syrian ports in a further display of Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thirteen ships are in the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Port Said, and as many as four are in Latakia, Syria.

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DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

20 July 1967

The Shelepin Ouster

1. The appointment of Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin as head of the Soviet trade unions marks a further setback for him which all but completes his political neutralization, a process begun in late 1965.

A. Shelepin had the support of a "Komsomol group," whose members began their careers in the apparatus of the youth organization when Shelepin was its boss. Recent personnel moves, including the removal of KGB Chairman Semichastny, have vitiated the group as a serious potential threat to the positions of Brezhnev and other senior members of the Politburo.

1. The group has generally been associated with hard-line policies.

a. They favor internal "vigilance," tighter domestic controls, and economic efficiency through primarily administrative methods.

b. In foreign policy they are believed to oppose detente with the West on grounds that this will lead to the ideological disarmament of communist forces.

B. The Middle East crisis seems to have been a catalyst. When faced with the explosive situation in the Middle East, Soviet foreign policy makers--Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny--clearly opted for

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cooperation with the U.S. to restrain the situation. This may have left the Young Turks more out of step with the party line than ever and, therefore, vulnerable.

1. In any event Moscow City party boss Yegorychev, who is an ideological soul-mate if not a member of the Shelepin faction, was tempted to criticize the Politburo's Mideast policies and was promptly ousted.
  2. Little more than a week later, Shelepin himself was demoted to the trade-union post.
  3. Another close Shelepin protégé, Komsomol chief Pavlov, may be the next victim of Brezhnev's purge.
- C. Although the men who have been chosen to replace Yegorychev and Semichastny appear to be less militant in their outlook, no significant changes in policy appear likely. Shelepin simply has not had a major voice in policymaking for some time. We do expect, however, that there will be some change in the execution of policy; some moderation in the rather abusive and heavy-handed style associated with Semichastny and Yegorychev.

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Performance of Top Leaders in Middle East Crisis

II. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny worked in close consort during the crisis. There was evidence of friction among them, but not of a critical nature.

A. With Kosygin in New York and Podgorny in Cairo problems of communication and coordination were enormous. Brezhnev acted as the peg point in Moscow issuing instructions and relaying information between Kosygin and Podgorny.

1. If there had been any serious disagreement and distrust between Brezhnev and Kosygin, Kosygin would not have been given the mission of representing the USSR at the UN.
2. Furthermore, it does not seem possible that this Soviet effort, carried out on three continents, could have been as smoothly orchestrated as it seems to have been, if there had had been much discord.

B. It is clear, however, that personal jealousy and a kind of mutual wariness between Kosygin and Brezhnev, which has been noted before, continued to place a strain on relationships.

1. The timing of the party plenum in Moscow to coincide with Kosygin's presence in New York strongly smacked of a ploy to provide Brezhnev with the public forum he had previously lacked to share the limelight with the premier.

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2. There was also evidence that Kosygin was operating on a tight rein in the US and that Brezhnev and Podgorny may have suspected that Kosygin would interpret his instructions a bit too liberally and perhaps take some actions which had not been previously agreed upon in Moscow.

#### Future Shape of the Collective Leadership

III. The senior members of the Politburo appear to have reached agreement quickly on how to respond to the Middle East crisis. To that extent they were in it together. Differences between them will probably open up again, however, as future problems present themselves.

A. There is apparently some questioning in party circles of the leadership's handling of the crisis.

1. There are reportedly those of the Yegorychev persuasion who advocate a stronger stand in support of the Arabs.
2. Grumbling is also coming from those who question the wisdom of having committed so much military and economic aid to the Arabs in the first place.

3. Recriminations over the debacle will undoubtedly continue in Moscow, and decisions on future foreign policy may not be easily achieved.
- B. Despite personal rivalry and differing views on policy questions, the Brezhnev-Kosygin relationship has stood up for over two years, it so far has weathered the current crisis and proved workable.
1. The leadership is under particular pressure to maintain at least the facade of unity during the jubilee 50th anniversary year.
  2. Ad hoc arrangements worked out after Khrushchev's ouster concerning the division of responsibilities, lines of command and general rules of procedure within the Politburo have been increasingly regularized with time and may lend a measure of stability.
- C. Some unexpected outside event could occur, of course, at any time to shatter the present delicate balance in the leadership.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
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MUTINY IN CONGO (KINSHASA)

- I. The mercenary mutiny has severely strained the tenuous stability which President Mobutu had managed to impose on the Congo during his months in office.
  - A. Mobutu's strong rule and effective use of military units had brought a semblance of stability to the country.
    - 1. Opposition elements--rebels, dissident local politicians, and tribal factions--had been subdued.
    - 2. The general economic decline since independence had been at least temporarily stopped, and monetary reform instituted.
    - 3. Relations with African neighbors had improved.
  - B. The mutiny and subsequent anti-white backlash may compromise these efforts.
    - 1. No clear information is available on the causes of the mutiny.

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- a. Certainly contributing was the fact that the mercenaries had not been paid for several months.
- b. They knew the Congolese were thinking of disbanding their units.
- c. Additionally, the mercenaries have a general disdain for the Congolese and tend to assume they can accomplish anything in the Congo that they set out to do.
- d. News of Moise Tshombé's kidnaping on 1 July may have sparked the mutiny.

(1) We do not believe, however, that this is a part of a bigger Tshombé plot to regain power in the Congo.

- 2. The mutiny, now subsiding, has had serious effects in the northeastern Congo and in Katanga Province.

- a. Security has been disrupted especially in Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville) and Bukavu, the two cities specifically affected.

(1) The safety of Europeans and Congolese in Kisangani was threatened during

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mercenary occupation. US-supplied C-130s were instrumental in evacuating over 600 persons.

(2) The Congolese Army went on a rampage of looting following their re-entry into both Kisangani and Bukavu. Many Congolese civilians have been terrorized. C-130s were also used to drop needed basic supplies and food to people in stricken areas.

(3) The mercenaries, having left Kisangani, settled down near Punia and their plans are not known. Should they continue south by land, more civilian lives could be in danger. The Congolese Army has been positioned to block them--again with C-130 help--but the ability of the army is questionable. The mercenaries have two operational T-28s at their disposal, and possibly some other light aircraft.

b. The Congo's economy has further deteriorated.

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- (1) European technicians who are necessary for running the Katangan copper mines have been badly frightened by reports of brutality in Lubumbashi (formerly Elisabethville) and many have decided to leave the Congo as soon as possible.
3. Mobutu has profited from his good relations with African countries, however.
- a. Ethiopia has agreed to send four F-86 fighter aircraft which left Addis Ababa for the Congo on 18 July.
- b. Ghana has agreed to provide six pilots to fly the Congo's T-28s in unarmed reconnaissance missions; they are due in the Congo on 19 July.
- C. If Mobutu can establish control soon, however, there may be a few positive results.
1. Mobutu's own political position has been strengthened.
2. The Congolese Army, having met and done fairly well against a much feared enemy, may have gained some self-confidence.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
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NIGERIA

I. The Nigerian crisis erupted into civil war on 6 July with federal military thrusts from the north into the former Eastern region (Biafra), which seceded on May 30.

A. The federal attack has advanced slowly in the face of stubborn Biafran resistance, severe logistical problems and the heavy rains. Advancing on two fronts--the northeast and northwest border areas--the federal army has made better progress in the northeast non-Ibo area. Biafran counterattacks in the northwest have apparently halted the federal thrust.

1. Both sides have suffered some loss of men and materiel, and Biafran troops have conducted several hit-and-run raids behind the federal advance in both sectors.

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2. The civil war is likely to continue for some time.

II. Maj. Gen. Gowon, head of the Nigerian Government, also has plans to land an amphibious force along the Biafran coast. Infiltration by soldiers into the coastal area in advance of this action may now be under way.

III. The small federal navy has effectively blockaded the major Eastern ports since early June. On 18 July however, the navy returned to Lagos, possibly to load the amphibious invasion force.

A. Oil exports were also halted by the inclusion of tankers in the blockade on 2 July, after Shell-BP had announced a token payment of revenues to Biafra.

1. The federal government is furious at Shell-BP and the UK, and there may well be changes in the contractual relationship between Nigeria and Shell-BP if the war against Biafra is successful.

B. Biafran governor Ojukwu is making strenuous efforts to charter ships to run the blockade, and a few reportedly carrying arms have already done so.

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- IV. Gowon, also angry at British procrastination over his arms request and at the US over its refusal to permit him to buy arms from commercial US sources, negotiated for armed jet trainers from Czechoslovakia.
- A. Six of these, with two Czech pilots for training purposes, are reportedly to arrive later this month.
- V. All US and UK personnel are being evacuated from the northern half of Biafra, although an augmented US consular staff is to remain in Enugu for the time being.
- A. An Italian ship is to take the evacuees from Port Harcourt to Lagos.
- B. Dependents of official personnel were evacuated from Biafra in early June.
- VI. Elsewhere in Nigeria, rumblings of plotting against established authority continue to be reported.
- A. Political intrigue will quickly start up after the civil war is over, no matter who wins.
1. If Biafra defeats the federal army, Nigeria is likely to disintegrate further.

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2. If Gowon gains control over Biafra, he will face a continuing Ibo dissension and probably guerrilla warfare.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS COMMITTEE

SOVIETS/CHICOM MILITARY AND SPACE DEVELOPMENTS

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I. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Soviets are pushing the development of several new or modified strategic missile systems.

A. We have identified three new types of silo launchers which are different than those now being deployed.

B. Meanwhile, Soviet missilemen are maintaining a brisk firing schedule with operational ICBMs-- the SS-7, SS-9, and SS-11. [REDACTED]

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C. Developmental work continues on the experimental missile we call the SS-X-6, or fractional orbit bombardment system. [REDACTED]

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II. The Soviet manned space program was hard-hit by the Soyuz-1 disaster.

- A. The expected standdown continues while the causes of the accident are investigated and corrected. Additional unmanned tests will be needed before another cosmonaut is committed. These may begin as early as this fall.
- B. Power and stabilization problems which occurred throughout the flight of Soyuz-1 probably contributed to the crash. These problems cut short the mission, which may have been planned to include rendezvous with a second spacecraft or transfer of crew members in flight.
- C. There is some evidence that the Soyuz capsule is part of a program aimed at manned circumlunar flight.

III. Two new classes of Soviet submarines are under construction.

(PHOTO, NEW SOVIET SUBMARINE)

- A. One of them is a new ballistic missile

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unit

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B. The second new submarine is believed to be the first unit of a new torpedo attack class, possibly intended for antisubmarine use.

IV. The Soviets are also building two new classes of large warships.

(PHOTO, NEW SOVIET WARSHIP)

A. One of these is the size of a light cruiser and is equipped with both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, the latest electronics, and an antisubmarine warfare weapon.

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B. The other new ship is a helicopter carrier.

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the carriers could be the nucleus of an antisubmarine group or an amphibious assault force.

V. Another development we are watching closely is a build-up of the Soviet military presence in Mongolia.

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A. Soviet military advisers and construction  
troops have been there for two years.

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S ADVANCED WEAPONS

- I. Communist China's detonation of a high-yield thermonuclear weapon on 16 June demonstrated that the Chinese have successfully solved the problem of thermonuclear weapon design.

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- II. It is clear that the highest priority is being accorded to the thermonuclear weapons program. The ultimate goal of this program is probably a warhead for the ICBM the Chinese are developing.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

HONG KONG

- I. Resolute action by the British authorities in Hong Kong during the past ten days or so has shaken up the local Communist apparatus, sapped its morale, and upset plans to create mass disorder.
  - A. Police, backed by troops, have been raiding local Communist control centers. Thus far more than 800 people have been arrested. Most of them are being released after questioning but the ring-leaders have been held for trial, and will be out of circulation for some time to come.
  - B. Mass violence in the streets is being firmly quelled. The police have been very tough, while at the same time seeking to avoid creating a host of martyrs who could be exploited to generate public support for the Communists.
- II. Despite these gains Hong Kong continues to be tense. Scattered riots are still taking place and there are

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[REDACTED]

sporadic outbreaks of terrorist activity targeted at the police and transportation services. The Colonial Government currently holds the initiative, however, and order is gradually being restored.

- A. Public services are functioning, although the transportation system continues to be harassed and the police are still under heavy pressure.
- B. A "food strike" reportedly scheduled to begin on 17 July has not materialized and shipments of meat and produce are still arriving from the mainland.
- C. A Communist call for a harbor strike has thus far received little response from seamen and dock workers.

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III. [REDACTED] that although many of the rank and file in the local Communist apparatus are disheartened by these setbacks, the hard-core leaders still at liberty are determined to keep up the struggle.

- A. The campaign, which began early in May, appears to have been started on their initiative rather than on specific orders from Peking. For

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[REDACTED]

this reason they probably feel compelled to press ahead.

- B. Unable to muster support from the population for mass disorders they appear to be relying on small-scale "hit and run" terrorist tactics.

IV. The prospect is for continued trouble during the coming weeks but unless Peking greatly increases its support for local Communist efforts it seems likely that the Hong Kong authorities will be able to keep the situation under control.

- A. The Chinese Communists have provided political backing for the campaign and given the local apparatus some clandestine financial support.
- B. Peking has thus far shown no disposition to go beyond this, however, and Chinese propaganda continues to emphasize the importance of efforts by the local Communist apparatus in carrying on the struggle.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

CHINESE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

I. The political crisis in China continues and no end is in sight.

A. For three months warring political factions have been engaging in violent clashes in many areas of the country.

B. We know

that this civil

disorder has caused considerable bloodshed, disrupted production in factories, and interrupted traffic on some vital rail lines.

1. There is no evidence, however, that it has seriously hindered aid shipments through China to North Vietnam, or that it is slowing down the Chinese advanced weapons program.

II. On June 6 the central committee issued a seemingly unequivocal and long overdue directive to the army to restore order.

A. It has not been vigorously enforced, however.

CHI-1

B. This does not suggest to us that the army is an unreliable instrument of control. By and large, army officers appear to be loyal and dependable.

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C. Instead, the failure to use force to end the fighting suggests that some elements in the leadership, presumably including Mao Tse-tung (MAW DZEH-DUNG) and Defense Minister Lin Piao (LIN BYAW), are determined to push the Cultural Revolution, regardless of the disorder it creates.

III. China continues to be ruled by a triumvirate composed of Mao Tse-tung (MAW DZEH-DUNG), Lin Piao (LIN BYAW), and Premier Chou En-lai (JOE EN-LYE). They maintain the appearance of unity in public, and Chou (JOE) remains the chief spokesman for the regime. We believe that their alliance is at best very shaky and uneasy.

A. Instability and confusion are likely to persist so long as Mao (MAW) retains sufficient power and vigor to push his Cultural Revolution and to combat real or imagined opposition to him and his radical policies.



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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

VIETNAM

- I. In Vietnam, we have been watching for several months the enemy build-up along the Demilitarized Zone.
  - A. The tempo of enemy operations in northern I Corps has continued to accelerate, accompanied by heavy and well-coordinated mortar, rocket, and artillery bombardments.
  - B. US Marines and South Vietnamese Army forces conducted a three-pronged offensive--Operation HICKORY--from 18 to 28 May against North Vietnamese regulars within and south of the DMZ. Heavy enemy contact subsequently developed, as reflected in the operation's final casualty toll of 800 Communists killed compared with allied losses of 164 killed and 1,018 wounded.
    1. In two subsequent operations--CIMARRON and BUFFALO--conducted in the same general area from 31 May to 13 July, US Marines killed nearly 1,400 additional NVA regulars and

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probably pre-empted major enemy assaults against a network of strategic Marine garrisons in northeastern Quang Tri Province. The cost to US forces was also heavy: 200 killed and 1,400 wounded.

- C. Early this year, elements of two North Vietnamese divisions began slipping back into Quang Tri Province.

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[redacted] major elements of possibly two other divisions are in or near the area. In addition, another North Vietnamese division has three third-generation regiments operating along the Laotian border of Quang Tri Province.

- D. In recent months the Communists have also extended a feeder road--Route 922--from the Laos Panhandle into the A Chau Valley of western Thua Thien Province, giving them their first motorable, through road from the North all the way down the Laotian Panhandle and into the South.
- E. Infiltration of North Vietnamese military personnel and supplies into South Vietnam appears to be continuing at a substantial level.

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
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1. A number of infiltration groups in recent months have been used as replacements for established Communist Main Force units. Captured documents and prisoner/defector interrogations indicate that heavy North Vietnamese troop reinforcements have been programmed for Communist regulars operating in the western highlands and in War Zones "C" and "D" north of Saigon.

2.



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Nearly all of these stations are part of some 50 mainline subordinates that have appeared since January, all of which may eventually be located in the Laos Panhandle or in adjacent areas of Cambodia and South Vietnam. This build-up is similar to one detected earlier in the DMZ area and appears to be a significant indication of the presence of additional NVA troops or of increased Hanoi interest in the area, or both.

- II. Prisoners, defectors, and captured documents indicated that the Communists planned a major "summer campaign" in the Quang Tri - Thua Thien areas.

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
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


the enemy's 1967 "summer campaign" would begin in early April in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces and expand to the western highlands and the coastal provinces of north-central Vietnam by June.

- B. Widespread and simultaneous allied spoiling operations in the I and II Corps areas have, however, delayed or disrupted the Communists' timetable.

1. Nevertheless, the current pattern of

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North Vietnamese forces in the DMZ/northern I Corps area and in the western highlands continue to reflect preparations for major offensive operations against allied troop concentrations and base installations.

2. In addition to continued heavy pressure against US Marine positions near the DMZ, the most immediate large-scale enemy threat appears to be focused in the Pleiku-Kontum-Cambodia tri-border area of the western

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highlands. Major coordinated operations by elements of the Communist's B-3 Front military command against allied Special Forces camps in western Kontum and Pleiku provinces are likely as the southwest monsoons render allied close air support increasingly difficult.

3. On balance, while a threat to such major population centers as Quang Tri and Hue cannot be ruled out, the Communists will probably continue to pursue a strategy of maneuver and attrition designed to spread allied forces thin and to protect their infiltration routes. In addition, periodic heavy strikes against key allied bases, such as the 15 July rocket attack against Da Nang air base

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can be expected to increase. Such actions afford the enemy an opportunity to achieve maximum results with minimum cost to themselves in terms of forces employed and casualties incurred. They also force the

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allies to divert troops from combat field operations to static security duties in defense of major bases.

- C. The Communists have stepped up their efforts to harass and kill the pacification teams. The effort is nationwide, but almost half of the 500-plus attacks since the first of January have taken place in the northern I Corps area.

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20 July 1967

SUPPLEMENT TO  
DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

VIETNAM: Step Up in Communist Firepower

- I. Our military command in Saigon has pulled together some statistics which will give you an idea of the increase in incoming enemy fire.
  - A. MAC-V figures for enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks--excluding enemy reaction to operations initiated by our side--show that in 1966 there were an average of 60 such incidents per month.
    1. In 1967 there were 44 incidents in January, 51 in February, but 141 in March and 100 in April.
    2. This increase is compounded by a greater number of rounds per incident, and heavier projectiles.
  - B. General Westmoreland's headquarters estimates that the weight of the incoming barrages was less than ten tons altogether during the last six months of 1967--but 49.4 tons for March and April alone in 1967.

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- C. This would seem to give added significance to our observations that the enemy moved 15 to 20 thousand tons of supplies south, to or across the South Vietnamese border, by daylight during the four-day Lunar New Year truce in mid-February.
- D. The enemy brought a number of new weapons into play in the first quarter of 1967. In 1966, his heaviest bombardment weapon was the 120-millimeter mortar.
- E. Now he is using Soviet 122 and 140-millimeter rockets, Chinese 102-millimeter rockets, and artillery firing 100, 105, 122 and 152-millimeter shells from positions in or behind the so-called "Demilitarized" Zone.
1. The 140-millimeter rocket has a range of about six miles, and the 122-millimeter about ten miles

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

- I. The prospects for a meaningful presidential contest on 3 September have improved in the past month as the military leadership weathered two election-associated crises.
  - A. Premier Ky's decision to withdraw his own bid and take the second spot on Chief of State Thieu's ticket dispelled, for the time being, the very real threat of a falling-out among the generals.
    1. Available evidence now suggests that the election tactics used to support the joint military slate will not be as blatant as those Ky was employing in behalf of his own candidacy.
    2. The campaign apparatus of the military ticket however should be more effective than the loosely-organized mechanisms of the civilian candidates.
  - B. Final approval by the Provisional National Assembly on 18 July of the Thieu/Ky ticket and its disapproval of the candidacy of "Big" Minh removed the second potential crisis.

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- [REDACTED]
1. On 17 July, a special committee in the assembly had disqualified Thieu, and the military leaders had privately decided to dissolve the constitution if the full assembly upheld the committee's ruling.
  - C. In the month-and-a-half remaining before the elections, the presidential race will probably boil down to a three-way contest between Thieu and civilian candidates Tran Van Huong and Phan Khac Suu.
    1. Although Thieu is given the best chance to win now, Huong will be a formidable opponent, especially if "Big" Minh throws his support behind him.
  - II. South Vietnam's first Senate will also be elected on 3 September, and the lower house election will follow by two months.
    - A. The forces behind the Thieu/Ky slate will attempt to elect a controllable majority in both houses of the legislature, although their efforts may be complicated by the multiplicity of 10-man slates competing for the 60 Senate seats.
  - III. Over the longer term, South Vietnam's political

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stability will rest on the ability of Thieu and Ky, if elected, to mute their rivalry and reach a clear-cut arrangement on sharing governmental power, or on the willingness of the military to accept the authority of a civilian winner.

VIET-11

NORTH VIETNAM

I. Hanoi's attitude toward negotiations has shown no change in recent months.

A. DRV spokesmen continue to repeat their January 1967 offer to talk with the US in exchange for a cessation of the bombings, but at the same time they continue to insist that the only basis for a permanent settlement is their well known "four point proposal."

II. The DRV leadership in early July suffered its first major loss in more than a decade, when politburo member Nguyen Chi Thanh, head of the Viet Cong insurgency in the South and one of the most outspoken militants in the Party, reportedly died of a heart attack in Hanoi on 6 July.

A. Filling Thanh's shoes both in the South and on the Politburo will pose problems for the leadership.

1. His experience and high military and political rank, and his close association with Party First Secretary Le Duan-- the principle architect of the revolution

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CONFIDENTIAL

in the South for more than a decade--  
combined to make Thanh almost uniquely  
qualified to direct the war in the South.

2. Thanh's death will reduce the strength  
of the militant wing of the party on the  
all important Politburo.
  - a. The contrast between Peking's effusive  
eulogies on his death and Moscow's  
reserved commentary suggests that  
Peking has lost one of its strongest  
supporters in Hanoi councils.
  - b. The relative balance of five militants  
and five moderates on the Politburo  
with Ho as final arbiter, was upset  
by Thanh's death. A further compli-  
cation for the leadership is sug-  
gested by the apparent poor health  
of party leader Ho Chi Minh, who has  
been unusually inactive for almost  
four months. The extent of his ill-  
ness is unknown.
  - c. If Ho should become incapacitated  
and unable to arbitrate between  
his lieutenants, a struggle for power  
could ensue with the militants

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gathering around Party Secretary  
Le Duan and the moderates backing  
Premier Pham Van Dong.

- d. It is important, however, to remember  
that both groups strongly support the  
same goal--eventual Communist control  
over South Vietnam; their only  
dispute is over the proper mix of  
tactics.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

LAOS

- I. The Communists have increased somewhat their pressure on government forces in northern Laos but there is still no evidence that they are planning to step up significantly the fighting during the current rainy season.
  - A. A Communist sabotage squad destroyed nine Laotian government tactical T-28 aircraft and damaged a tenth in a pre-dawn raid on 16 July at the Luang Prabang airfield.
    1. This action probably was a hit-and-run enemy retaliation against these aircraft, the backbone of recent government efforts to counter Communist forces harassing government outposts in northern Laos.
  - B. In other areas of Laos, fighting between government and Communist forces remains at a low level.

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II. Meanwhile in Vientiane, Prime Minister Souvanna successfully recently reorganized his cabinet, adding four new, young deputy ministers.

A. This modest success, in part the result of his improved relations with key military commanders and the assembly, has reinforced somewhat Souvanna's determination to stay in office for the foreseeable future.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMITTEE

GREECE

- I. The military regime remains in unquestioned control. Political life is sharply proscribed and censorship of the domestic press is being maintained.
  - A. In spite of these stringent measures, a general air of popular acceptance and even satisfaction in the regime exists.
  - B. Effective organized resistance in the near future appears doubtful.
- II. Over half of the original suspect Communist detainees have now been released. However, a number of political leaders are either imprisoned or under house arrest.
  - A. Andreas Papandreou remains in an Athens prison apparently well treated.
    - 1. The regime has been in no hurry to begin trial proceedings against Andreas, but have indicated he will not be executed.

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2. Interior Minister Pattakos has expressed interest in Andreas US citizenship status, perhaps out of a desire to deport him to the US.

III. One step toward a return to parliamentary government was taken with the formation of a constitutional review committee which has been meeting for the last month.

- A. Its work is to be submitted to the junta by mid-December.
- B. No timetable for a popular referendum or subsequent elections has been mentioned.
- C. The regime clearly intends to carry out its expressed aims of totally "cleansing" the country's institutions.

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20 July 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

CYPRUS

- I. A relative calm has prevailed on Cyprus in recent months.
- II. Relations between Greece and Cyprus, however, became strained in late May over alleged Greek "threats" against elements on the island that were believed to oppose union of the island with Greece.
  - A. The Cypriots feared that the Greek regime was planning to overthrow the Makarios government.
  - B. It is clear that the junta is interested in settling the Cyprus problem, but the group has no firm policy and no definitive action appears imminent.
- III. Athens probably would not attempt any unilateral solution without prior notification of the Turks.
  - A. New contacts have been reported between Athens and Ankara aimed at some preliminary agreements toward a solution.

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- [REDACTED]
- B. In spite of the determination in both capitals, however, the road to a solution will not be smooth.
  - C. Athens faces not only the difficulty of obtaining Makarios' agreement or acquiescence, but of offering acceptable concessions to Ankara.
  - D. Ankara remains wary of Athens' ability to control the wily Makarios. Moreover, the Turks have indicated that they fear any agreement reached with the junta may not be upheld by any succeeding political government in Athens.

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